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REgions
Americas
Colombia’s Expansion of Military
Jurisdiction Under Fire
The Colombian government has historically struggled to hold military officials
accountable for human rights violations
committed during the armed conflict with
leftist guerillas. After the military’s “falsepositives” scandal in 2008 revealed that
soldiers staged battles and killed civilians
they had dressed as guerillas to increase
body counts and thus receive financial
bonuses, former President Álvaro Uribe
ordered that cases dealing with human
rights violations by military personnel be
adjudicated by civilian courts to ensure
impartiality. Civilian jurisdiction over
these cases could now be reduced under
a controversial constitutional amendment,
which would strengthen and reform
military courts, proposed by President
Juan Manuel Santos’ government.
On December 11, 2012, the Colombian
Senate approved the proposed constitutional amendment. The amendment surfaced as a response to reports of unfair
rulings for military personnel in civilian
courts. According to military officials, the
uncertainty arising from prosecuting military officials in civilian courts has been
detrimental to soldiers’ combat and operational responsibilities. The legislation
would grant the military justice system
jurisdiction over crimes of service, while
keeping crimes such as murder, extrajudicial executions, and other human rights
violations in civilian courts. The Tribunal
of Criminal Guarantees (Tribunal de
Garantías), which includes both civilians
and former military officials, would make
the threshold jurisdictional determination.
The point of contention over the
amendment is its ambiguity regarding the
scope of military service and what circumvents the military court’s jurisdiction.
While the Colombian Supreme Court has
held that human rights should always be
adjudicated in civilian courts, the lack
of a definition for “extrajudicial executions” in the proposed amendment complicates the Supreme Court’s ability to grant

exclusive jurisdiction to civilian courts for
“false positives” cases. The new amendment would once again expand military
jurisdiction over cases arising from military service.
President Santos and Minister of
Defense Juan Carlos Pinzón support military judicial reform as a way to ensure that
adequate measures are taken to investigate
and adjudicate military crimes. Advocates
for reform reiterate that human rights
violations will continue to be sent to civilian courts and will not remain under the
jurisdiction of military courts. The Senate
approved the amendment with a specified
list of violations that would always be
transferred to civilian courts. Supporters of
the reforms view them as a way to ensure
judicial accountability through courts-martial in military courts and the due process
and sentencing in civilian courts for crimes
outside the scope of military service.
The amendment has faced heavy criticisms from international organizations
and human rights advocates. José Miguel
Vivanco, Director of Human Rights
Watch’s Americas division, echoed many
of the concerns that these advocates have
about a historically weak military justice
system that would grant impunity to military criminals. Amnesty International also
stated its fears that the Tribunal of Criminal
Guarantees would easily be persuaded to
allow certain human rights violations, such
as “false-positives,” to be heard in military
courts, which would contradict international norms and the Supreme Court’s
1997 decision. In that decision, human
rights advocates were able to ensure the
inclusion of a list of crimes that would
remain out of the jurisdiction of military
courts, but the ambiguity of the term
“extrajudicial executions” could exclude
the false-positive killings.
Human Rights Watch points to rulings
in the Colombian Supreme Court as well
as the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights’ (IACTHR) 2008 ruling in Rochela
v. Colombia, where the Court determined
that a military court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate or investigate any
military issues that relate to alleged human
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rights violations. While the Minister of
Defense insists that any cases dealing with
human rights will be transferred to civilian
jurisdiction, advocates point to a cumbersome and slow system in which military
judges are weary of transferring cases
for fear of retaliation by their peers. The
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial
Executions noted in 2010 that Colombia’s
failure to adequately transfer cases created
a judicial system that often could not effectively determine the appropriate jurisdiction for a case.
Both the United Nations and the
Organization of American States (OAS)
have expressed their disapproval of the
proposed amendment, and the IACtHR has
determined that the amendment does not
meet the OAS’s human rights standards.
If the Colombian Congress approves the
amendment, the International Federation of
Human Rights, a coalition of human rights
organizations, may seek an investigation
by the International Criminal Court into
Colombia as a state with a “lack of will to
prosecute,” which could result in the prosecution of Colombian military officials
accused of human rights violations.
Effective controls for transferring
and determining jurisdiction, as well as
concrete definitions for crimes automatically under civilian jurisdiction, are now
potential additions to the amendment.
The amendment will now be voted on in
Colombia’s House of Representatives for
ratification. As Santos’ government continues peace talks with leftist guerillas,
Colombia is struggling to meld domestic
legal accountability for military crimes
with its responsibility to adjudicate alleged
human rights violations in civilian courts.

No Swearing (In): Is Venezuelan
Officials’ Silencing of the Media a
Violation of Human Rights?
As Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez
continues his cancer recovery, a battle
between the Chavistas and the president’s
opposition is growing over the disputed
constitutionality of the delayed swearing
in of the president for his newest term. The
public debate over the delay created media
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coverage on Chávez’s condition and the
legality of postponing the oath of office.
The Chávez Administration is taking steps
to downplay the increasing pressure coming from the opposition’s stance against
allowing the presidency to remain in limbo
with Chávez outside of the country.
Following Chávez’s reelection, he
traveled to Cuba for a fourth surgery
in December 2012 and has remained
there since to recover. The Venezuelan
Constitution stipulates that the presidentelect must be sworn into office on January
10. On January 8, 2013, the Chávez
Administration announced that the president would be unable to return to Venezuela
to take the formal oath of office; instead,
he would take the oath before the country’s
highest court upon full recovery. As the
January 10 deadline passed, the opposition
called for new elections and marched in
protest of the postponed swearing-in.
With the opposition demanding a
response from the government, the proChávez National Assembly supported the
delay, declaring that it would give the president as much time as required for him to
recover. The Venezuelan Supreme Court
also ruled that the delay was legal under the
Venezuelan Constitution. The Court’s unanimous decision emphasized that the oath
was an important formality of the beginning
of a presidential term but not indispensable. The Court noted that the Venezuelan
Constitution grants it the authority to allow
the oath to occur later unless the president’s
absence becomes permanent.
The National Telecommunication Council
of Venezuela (CONTATEL) officially
opened investigations against Globovisión
after it questioned the constitutionality of the
court’s decision. This investigation follows
the January 6 raid of blogger Medina Ravell’s
home after he questioned the information
given by the government regarding President
Chávez’s health.
CONTATEL relied on Article 27 of
Venezuela’s broadcasting law to cease
showing certain segments dealing with
President Chávez’s health and the constitutionality of the delayed oath. The law
prohibits the broadcasting of materials
that “foment anxiety in the population or
threaten public order,” and delegitimizes
government authorities. The government
also cited a provision of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Right’s
(ICCPR’s) Article 19(3)(b) that allows

governments to restrict freedom of expression to protect national security and public order. CONTATEL ordered the halt of
transmissions of speeches questioning the
legitimacy of the government’s position and
criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Globovisión is potentially facing sanctions,
including a brief shutdown or a fine of up
to ten percent of its gross annual income.
Sanctioning media outlets and social
media forums for discussing the current
state of Venezuelan politics has been criticized by members of the international
community as political censorship. The
domestic broadcasting law is now seemingly in conflict with Venezuela’s commitment to adhere to the ICCPR that guarantees the right to freedom of expression.
Article 19 of the ICCPR protects the right
to seek, receive, and impart information
regardless of frontiers or media sources.
The Office of the Special Rapporteur
on the Freedom of Expression for the
Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (IACHR) has previously accused
the Venezuelan government of media censorship through the detention of journalists
and the prohibition of the circulation of
certain publications. In a communication
to the Foreign Minister of Venezuela in
June 2010, Special Rapporteur Catalina
Botero Marino expressed her deep concern
over the use of instruments such as criminal law to silence dissent in the country.
The IACHR also noted in a 2010 report
that Venezuelan journalists are not “able
to freely carry out their work” and that a
pattern of impunity for violence against
media members continues to hamper freedom of expression in the country. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in
its 2009 decision Perozo et.al. v. Venezuela,
held that Venezuela needed to continue to
strengthen its redress and criminal investigations for violations of freedom of speech
and adopt measures to reduce impediments
to the freedom of speech and media.
With the support of the Venezuelan
Supreme Court and Vice President Nicolas
Maduro moving the administration forward, the opposition to the constitutionality of the oath delay continues to diminish.
The absence of Chávez was ruled to be a
“temporary absence” by the highest court
in Venezuela and as long as he eventually returns, he will continue to enjoy
support from the National Assembly and
other officials within the government. The
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constitutionality of the delay could become
a moot point if President Chávez’s recovery is weeks away, as indicated by Vice
President Maduro.
With the legality of the delay of the
oath affirmed by the Supreme Court, the
more prominent issue continues to be the
treatment and censorship of the media
in relation to its criticism of the government. CONTATEL’s investigation into
Globovisión is the most recent attempt to
censor government critics in the media. The
practice of attempting to control information has continued throughout the Chávez
Administration and included charges of
offenses “contrary to national security”
that have resulted in self-censorship by
members of the media.
In November, the IACHR held a hearing where members of the Venezuelan
media alleged that the Venezuelan government impeded their ability to gain access
to public information. The journalists
alleged that the intimidation tactics have
resulted in censorship that violates Article
57 of the Venezuela Constitution. While
Venezuela continues to deny working outside of its international legal obligations,
the line between censorship and protection
of public order continues to blur.
Ernesto Alvarado, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Female Migrant Farmworkers are
Often Targets of Sexual Violence
and Harassment
Migrant farmworkers are often excluded
from basic worker protections, leading to
instances of wage theft, child labor, hazardous working conditions, and pesticide
exposure. These abuses are predominantly
attributed to the fact that the majority of
farmworkers are undocumented or are
employed through a guest worker program
that lacks government oversight, consequently placing these individuals at risk
of serious human rights violations. The
ability to join labor unions and to access
collective bargaining is largely nonexistent
for many farmworkers, further exacerbating a severe power imbalance between
employers and migrant farmworkers. This
power imbalance also leads to additional
abuse of female farmworkers who are subjected to sexual violence and harassment
at the hands of their male bosses including
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rape, stalking, and unwanted touching.
These women face significant hurdles in
accessing justice for these crimes due to
fear of reprisals, deportation, and separation from their children. As a result, many
women do not report crimes, allowing
reoccurrence of the abuse.
According to Human Rights Watch, at
least fifty percent of the agricultural workforce in the United States is comprised
of unauthorized immigrants. Moreover,
those holding temporary worker visas
greatly depend upon their employer for
their continued stay in the United States,
which contributes to the power disparity.
Of the estimated 1.8 million agricultural
workers, approximately 24 percent are
female. Human Rights Watch interviewed
fifty female farmworkers countrywide and
reportedly almost every woman personally
experienced sexual violence or harassment
or knew of someone who personally experienced sexual violence or harassment.
Perpetrators are typically foremen, supervisors, farm labor contractors, company
owners, and others in a position of power
over farmworkers.
The U.S. government ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and therefore
is legally obligated to guarantee all persons within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the right to security of
persons, the right to be free from torture
and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to redress when sexual
abuses occur. Furthermore, under Article
26 of the ICCPR as well as the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the
United States is required to provide equal
protection of the law irrespective of a
person’s legal status. United States law
prohibits workplace sexual harassment
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which must be equally realized by the
entire U.S. workforce.
Despite the aforementioned safeguards,
the U.S. government is falling short in its
duty to protect persons growing U.S. food.
Reauthorization of the Senate version of
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
would provide additional protections for
undocumented women who are victims of
sexual violence, yet it remains stalled in
the U.S. House of Representatives. Through
VAWA, the U-visa program provides
undocumented victims legal status and
work authorization when reporting violent

crimes, ultimately ensuring protection for
the victim and minimizing fear of deportation. Since the institution of the program,
U-visas have been instrumental in providing a measure of protection for victims
otherwise without legal options of recourse.
The U.S. government is obligated to provide
effective legal remedies as enumerated in
Article 2 of the ICCPR; therefore, a lack of
provision may constitute a failure to meet its
human rights responsibilities.
The U.S. government has also failed to
enact a comprehensive national solution
to immigration that respects the rights of
everyone within U.S. borders. Deportation
continues to be used as a tool to threaten
and disempower undocumented farmworkers, putting the population at risk of sexual
violence and harassment. Providing legal
status for farmworkers will afford necessary protections for the population, which
will help realize the country’s international
human rights obligations. Meaningful
immigration reform will also abate fears
of deportation for many, thus ensuring
access to justice for victims who are currently unable to report inhumane working
conditions or other crimes.
The widespread abuses facing female
agricultural workers are likely a product of
a failing immigration system and barriers
to reporting sexual abuse. The U.S. government is obligated to protect all persons
within its borders, including the 11.1 million undocumented individuals currently in
the United States. Legislation addressing
the undocumented workforce and affording
necessary protections in line with human
rights principles will advance the government’s responsibility to protect all persons
living and working in the United States.
Legal status will result in increased access
to mechanisms that protect the human rights
of farmworkers, which will effectively
expand their leverage to speak out and
expose inhumane working conditions in the
country. Victims of sexual abuse will also
be able to access a ready means of redress
without fear of deportation since their ability to stay in the country would no longer
depend on employers.

Without a Legal Home:
Statelessness in the Bahamas
Thousands of Bahamian-born persons
of Haitian descent are stateless. Although
the stateless situation of Dominicanborn persons of Haitian descent has
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been well-documented, the situation of
Bahamian-born persons of Haitian descent
remains largely unstudied, limiting the
international community’s understanding
of the gravity of this problem. According to
the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, an individual is stateless when he
or she is without a nationality or citizenship
in any state. Statelessness occurs when a
person never obtains citizenship in his or
her birth country or when a person loses
citizenship in one country and has no claim
to citizenship in another country. Estimates
of approximately 30,000 to 50,000 Haitian
immigrants and their children are denied
Bahamian citizenship — despite some
being born in the Bahamas — and are also
without citizenship in Haiti, leaving them in
a state of limbo with no place to officially
call home. Children born to non-Bahamian
parents or to a Bahamian mother and a nonBahamian father born outside the Bahamas
are not able to automatically obtain citizenship upon birth. These children, even
though born in the Bahamas, cannot apply
for citizenship until their eighteenth birthday. Furthermore, due to significant hurdles
and long waiting times during the application process, generations are reportedly left
de facto stateless.
Nationality is the legal bond an individual has with a state. Living without
a nationality has dire consequences to
individuals because it prevents them from
benefiting from the protection and assistance of the government. As a result of
Bahamian exclusionary policies, individuals are often marginalized and live in
extreme poverty, without access to basic
services, including education, health services, and legal processes for instances of
abuse and exploitation. A large number
of Haitians and Haitian Bahamians who
cannot afford their own property in the
Bahamas live in shantytowns, all without
running water, electricity, or waste management. Tensions in society are mounting as Haitians and Haitian Bahamians
are unjustifiably blamed for the country’s
crime problems and lack of resources.
The Bahamas is a State Party to the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC), which provides in Article 7 that
a child shall have the right to acquire
a nationality immediately after birth.
Upon ratification, however, the government made specific reservations relating
to Article 2, which requires States Parties
to ensure that each child enjoys the rights
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enumerated in the Convention irrespective
of the child’s or his or her parent’s national,
ethnic or social origin, “insofar as the provision relates to the conferment of citizenship
upon a child.” Nonetheless, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), in Articles 15 and
24 respectively, provide every child the right
to nationality. In 2008, the Bahamas ratified
the ICCPR, requiring the country to fully
implement the provisions into domestic law.
As a State Party to the ICCPR, the
Bahamas is legally obligated to ensure
children born in the Bahamas have access
to a nationality. The government of the
Bahamas has argued that those born in
the Bahamas to non-Bahamian parents
can acquire citizenship elsewhere or
can wait until their eighteenth birthday,
options they allege fulfill their obligations.
However, for many, obtaining citizenship
elsewhere proves futile or, more importantly, unreasonable since the Bahamas is
the only country they have ever known.
Additionally, some applicants wait years
to be approved for Bahamian citizenship.
Countries like the United States that
have birthright citizenship laws guarantee citizenship and equal standing under
the law to all who are born in the United
States. A number of countries have moved
away from automatically guaranteeing citizenship upon birth — including Australia,
Ireland, India, the United Kingdom, and
the Dominican Republic — contributing
to the already-existing and serious problem
of statelessness. Countries that experience
high volumes of immigrants who tend to
remain in the country long-term, like the
Bahamas, may need to consider nationality legislation in accordance with international human rights norms.
In order to fulfill its obligations under
the ICCPR, the Bahamian government
must ensure all persons born on its soil
have access to a nationality. Through effective nationality legislation and a universal
birth registration, Bahamian people’s right
to nationality will be protected against
potentially discriminatory practices which
target minority groups. If children are
registered upon birth, all Bahamians —
regardless of descent — will have access
to birth papers and therefore will not be
prevented from enjoying equal access to
opportunities, including in the fields of
education, employment, and health.

Diana Damschroder, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Asia and Oceania
Bridal Kidnapping: A Kyrgyz
Method of Marriage
On the eve of their wedding, a third of
all Kyrgyz brides hear the traditional mantra: “Every good marriage begins in tears.”
The custom, known as ala kachuu (or “grab
and run”), has been on the rise for the last
fifty years. Between eight and twelve thousand girls are kidnapped and forced into
marriage each year. Because of the stigma
surrounding the socialization of single men
and women, and the rising expense of a
traditional dowry, some Kyrgyz men have
found kidnapping to be a cheaper alternative to courtship. Under current Kyrgyz law,
a man will face a maximum of five years
in prison for forcing a woman to marry
against her will, but he will face eleven
years for stealing cattle. As the Kyrgyz
parliament moves to reform the laws concerning bride-kidnapping, it is obligated
to abide by the terms of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), United Nations Declaration
on the Elimination of Violence against
Women, the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for
Marriage and Registration of Marriage.
The Declaration preceded the drafting of
CEDAW, and Kyrgyzstan has since acceded
to all three conventions.
Under this practice, when a man decides
to take a wife, he will gather a large group
of his male peers and plot to get the woman
alone. The woman is then forcibly taken to
the man’s home, where her future in-laws
attempt to subdue her long enough to get
a shawl, symbolizing submission, onto her
head. The woman is raped on the first night
— if she is not, the community will still
treat her as unchaste anyway. In the morning, the woman must choose between marriage and banishment from society. Eighty
percent of kidnapped women choose marriage. Under the ICCPR, Kyrgyzstan is
obliged to ensure “no marriage shall be
entered into without the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.” The
Convention on Consent to Marriage raises
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this bar by requiring that consent “be
expressed by them in person after due
publicity and in the presence of the authority competent to solemnize the marriage
and of witnesses.” However, while formal
consent requirements may provide some
safeguards for Kyrgyz women, no current
international obligations can adequately
deal with the reality that many kidnapped
women will be viewed as “unfit to marry”
after being raped.
The rate of spousal abuse is much
higher in forced marriages, where the
women are often beaten, starved, stabbed,
raped, isolated, and even killed. In the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women, the United Nations
General Assembly urged that Member
States “condemn violence against women
and should not invoke any custom, tradition or religious consideration to avoid
their obligation with respect to its elimination.” Physical, sexual, and psychological violence within the family; dowryrelated violence; and marital rape are
included within the definition of “violence against women.” Former UN Special
Rapporteur on Violence against Women
Radhika Coomaraswamy also stated that
religious and cultural considerations were
not a legitimate reason to justify violence
against women.
In 2009, the Special Rapporteur visited
Kyrgyzstan and issued a report, which
included the issue of bride-kidnapping.
Among the numerous recommendations
suggested by the report, Kyrgyzstan was
urged to “increase the criminal penalty for
bride abduction and coercion into marriage, withdraw the possibility of imposing
only a fine and provide stringent penalties
for conspiracy and aiding and abetting in
this crime.” Although Kyrgyzstan is not
legally bound by the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women,
it is obligated to provide the reforms
outlined in CEDAW. This includes taking “all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing
laws, regulations, customs and practices
which constitute discrimination against
women.” Under the CEDAW requirements,
Kyrgyzstan is also legally obliged to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which
are based on the idea of the inferiority or
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the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.”
For Kyrgyzstan to comply with its
international obligations concerning the
rights of women, it is legally obligated to
reform its laws and penalties regarding
forced marriage. Given the modifications
to the Kyrgyz Constitution in 2010, change
seems to be on the horizon. The new constitution includes the following clause, which
is a hopeful sign for the necessary reforms:
“In the Kyrgyz Republic men and women
shall have equal rights and freedoms and
equal opportunities for their realization.”
The implementation and enforcement of
international principles relating to women
could prove to be a good starting place for
reform.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Legal Roadblocks Hinder North
Korean Migrants’ Efforts to
Escape Oppressive Conditions
North Koreans seeking to flee the
reportedly oppressive conditions within
the country face a crackdown on defectors instituted by Supreme Leader Kim
Jong-Un while struggling to find protections in nearby states. According to
reports, shortly after assuming leadership
from his late father, Kim Jong-Il, Jong-Un
ordered border police to execute defectors
on site, and made defection “a crime of
treachery against the nation.”
Despite the risk, thousands continue to
flee the country every year and criticism
continues to mount against the nation’s
practices. In March of 2012, the United
Nations Human Rights Council indicated
its concern over the North Korean government’s significant human rights violations.
Reports out of the country allege systematic use of torture, inhumane prison conditions, incarceration for political beliefs,
forced labor, and arbitrary application of
the death penalty. Even those not detained
are affected by the pervasive malnourishment resulting from a lack of food security.
To escape the conditions, many North
Korean defectors seek refuge in South
Korea, which is an extremely difficult journey both physically and legally. A heavily
fortified demilitarized zone makes crossing directly into South Korea difficult, so

most defectors instead travel north through
China to third states, such as Thailand or
Mongolia, where they seek refuge in South
Korean consulates. Estimates indicate that
up to 200,000 North Koreans are in hiding in China where they are vulnerable to
exploitation, forced marriages, and human
trafficking. Only about 25,000 have successfully completed the journey to South
Korea. The number of North Koreans
arriving in South Korea fell to a tenyear low in 2012; only 1,509 successfully
completed the journey, almost half of the
amount in 2011.
For those who do not make it to South
Korea, a difficult legal journey may also
ensue as defectors are detained, mostly
in southern China. The policy of repatriation is controlled by a bilateral treaty, the
Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work
of Maintaining National Security and
Social Order in the Border Areas between
North Korea and China, which stipulates
in Article 4 that the two countries will
work together to prevent residents from
illegally crossing the border but allows
residents to cross the boundary legally
due to “calamity or unavoidable factors.”
However China generally does not recognize North Koreans as meeting this standard and instead deems them “economic
migrants.” The determination thus leads to
return to North Korea.
Also relevant, however, is the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol, which impose direct obligations upon China, a State Party to both,
as well as possibly context for interpretation of the bilateral treaty, under Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. The Refugee Convention
defines a refugee under Article 1 as a person who, “owing to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality,
and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country.” Although the Convention
has its limits, under Article 33 it prohibits
refoulement, the return of a refugee to
a territory where his or her life or liberty would be threatened “on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political
opinion.”
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The UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
makes clear that economic migrants are
not necessarily refugees, though economic
migrants can attain refugee status if, after
expatriation, they cannot return due to fear
of persecution under one of the prescribed
criteria. China has declined to grant refugee status to North Korean defectors, but
other States have, including the United
States, adding credence to the argument
that the defectors qualify as refugees.
UNHCR declared seven North Korean
defectors as refugees in 2001 and in 2012
called on China to respect non-refoulement;
however the agency also generally refers to
the defectors as “detained North Koreans.”
China refuses to grant UNHCR access
to the North Koreans seeking refugee status. Furthermore, China continues to read
the bilateral treaty to provide for return of
North Korean defectors, and China returns
5,000 North Korean detainees annually.
This discourages defection; would-be
defectors must evaluate the high risks
involved in fleeing. Fear of being detained
and forcibly returned, coupled with fear of
harsh punishment upon return, likely prevents many from trying, but some North
Koreans still brave the risks.

Chinese Workers Could See
Better Access to Services Under
Hukou System Reform
The Chinese government has recently
shown signs that it is considering reforming the hukou system, which requires all
citizens to be registered in their places of
birth and has made it difficult for those
with rural registration to access social
services when they move to urban areas.
Hukou, in place since 1958, limits individuals’ access to social services, such as pensions, employment benefits, health care,
public schooling, and access to university
entrance exams, by barring citizens from
utilizing such services when outside their
registered geographic region. Designation
of hukou status is inherited, so children
face the same restrictions as their parents.
Management and implementation of the
hukou system is a function of the provincial governments, thus efforts to reform
generally come from provinces. Though
many smaller cities have lowered barriers for workers to change resident status,
many larger cities, including Beijing and
Shanghai, have not, due to fears of rapid
urban migration. Currently, only forty
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percent of the considerable population that
has internally relocated in search of work
has been able to obtain either permanent
or temporary resident status in urban areas.
As a result, rural residents are forced
to make difficult choices when relocating
in search of employment: either leave their
children so they may attend compulsory
public school or bring them and pay for
private schooling. The estimated nineteen
million children who were brought to urban
areas under these circumstances chose
either to attend private schools established
specifically for children without residential hukou or receive no education. In spite
of this, more than 200 million Chinese
workers have left rural areas — leaving
behind benefits and sometimes family —
in search of better, though limited, employment in urban areas. According to a survey
done in 2006 by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China, a government organ,
the income of urban residents was over
three times that of rural residents.
In addition to the country’s constitutional guarantee of state-subsidized health
care, education, and pensions to all of
its citizens, China is obligated under the
International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to
respect the right to education (Article 13).
Article 13 requires compulsory and available primary education, the general availability of secondary education, and equal
access to higher education, though reports
indicate that children from rural areas have
fewer educational opportunities and must
pay for those they do have. The ICESCR
further requires States Parties to promote
equality and fairness in wages and freedom in pursuit of employment, particularly
with regard to the freedom of choice and
equality in the workplace (Articles 6 and
7). However, a report published by the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights described the hukou system
as “de facto discrimination against internal
migrants in the fields of employment,
social security, health services, housing
and education.” Such workers, according
to the government-owned China’s Global
Times newspaper, are treated as “illegal
immigrants in their own country.”
As a State Party to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), China has accepted the obligation to preserve citizens’ freedom of movement and residence as enumerated in the

Article 12 of the treaty. The UN Human
Rights Committee’s General Comment No.
27 to the treaty, on Freedom of Movement
(Article 12), highlights the right to move
freely within the whole national territory as indispensable. The hukou system
requires that those who decide to move
sacrifice essential services.
Though the central government has yet
to mandate national reform, in 2008, the
Deputy Secretary General of the National
Development and Reform Commission
stated the hukou system would be eliminated by 2020. In December 2012, the
Chinese government issued statements that
it remains concerned about a rapid influx
of movement to cities but that it still
intends to reform the hukou system by
streamlining the process of changing registration in order to increase the incomegenerating power and spending ability of
rural residents who move to urban areas.
Should reform or elimination of the hukou
system come to fruition, China would take
a significant step toward greater access to
services for its citizens regardless of their
birthplace and simultaneously break a barrier to upward mobility that has stood in
the way of millions of Chinese people.
Gabriel Auteri, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

The Philippines Passes the
Progressive Anti-Enforced
Disappearance Act
The Philippines has a long history of
enforced disappearances, numbering in the
two thousands since the dictatorship of
Ferdinand Marcos when martial law was
enacted in the 1970s, according to The New
York Times. However, in December 2012,
President Benigno S. Aquino III approved
the Republic Act 10353, known as the “AntiEnforced or Involuntary Disappearance
Act of 2012,” which was passed by the
Philippine Congress in October. This Act
targets state agents and officials who confined or arrested individuals without proper
process and detained those individuals outside the law’s protection.
The Act defines enforced disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty
committed by agents of the State” or by
those “acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State followed
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by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the
fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which places such person outside
the protection of the law.” The Act defines
“enforced disappearance” with the same
wording as the United Nations International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance, which the
Philippines has neither signed, ratified, nor
is a state party to.
Those forced into disappearance, usually political dissidents, are often subject
to torture and abuse at the hands of state
officials and are outside the realm of the
law’s protection since their detainment
is not publicly registered. This treatment
conflicts with the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which the
Philippines ratified in 1986, under Article
9, the right to not be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention. Abuse of this
nature also implicates the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
which the Philippines acceded to in 1986.
In an effort to build upon the substantial decrease of enforced disappearances
since the Marcos regime, when many political opponents were arbitrarily arrested
and tortured, the new law seeks to prevent
future enforced disappearances. The new
law will prohibit all disappearances and
does not permit suspension of that principle. Specifically, if a superior officer
orders a subordinate to disappear someone, the superior officer can be penalized
and the subordinate officer has the right
to defy the order. According to the law,
there must be up-to-date registration of all
detained persons and detention facilities.
All detained individuals also have the right
to communicate their whereabouts to others. To cut off a mechanism of enforced
disappearances, the law prohibits “orders
of battle” — a document listing all the supposed enemies of the State.
Furthermore, all those who “directly
committed,” “encouraged,” “cooperated,”
“allowed…or abetted” the act of enforced
disappearance will be subject to a penalty of reclusion perpetua — essentially
life imprisonment. Individuals who had
knowledge that the act of enforced disappearance transpired, without actually
having participated in the act itself, face
imprisonment as well. The individuals who
have knowledge of the occurrence of such
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acts of enforced disappearance have a duty
to report the act to the Department of the
Interior and Local Government. Victims of
enforced disappearance and their relatives
are entitled to monetary compensation
and “restitution of honor and reputation.”
Those penalized for committing this act
are allowed no amnesty.
According to Section 18 of the law, a
trial and decision for violating this act in
a Filipino court is independent of the trial
and decision of an international court using
international human rights laws. Although
the Act is laudable and provides progressive change, the Philippines has still not
ratified the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, which was adopted by
the United Nations General Assembly in
2006 and entered into force in 2010. The
Philippines could comprehensively tackle
the issue of enforced disappearance by
acceding to this Convention since its Article
26 allows for the Committee on Enforced
Disappearances to monitor such disappearances within states. Without a mechanism
to monitor disappearances and enforce the
new act, there is no outside oversight to
ensure that disappearances do not occur.

Anti-Trafficking Legislation
Inadequately Combating Sextrafficking in India
A growing occurrence of rural prostitution, sex tourism, and traditional notions
of gender bias contribute to the prevalence
of prostitution and the sex trafficking in
India. According to India’s federal police,
more than one million children are prostituted in India — “a source, transit nation,
and destination” of the sexual-slavery
industry. The actual numbers on sex trafficking in India are more difficult to ascertain because of the “clandestine nature” of
sex trafficking, but India’s Home Secretary
commented that around 100 million people
“were [also] involved in human trafficking in
India.” Although most victims are girls who
are trafficked within India, many are also
girls who are trafficked across borders from
Nepal and Bangladesh and sent to urban red
light areas in Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata.
An internationally accepted definition
of trafficking, as defined by the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons Especially Women and
Children, which supplements the United
Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime (UN TIP, Protocol), is
the “recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harbouring or receipt of persons” by using
“force[,] . . . coercion, abduction, fraud,
[and] deception” to control and exploit
another person, including, but not limited
to, sex exploitation.
The Indian Constitution under Article
23 specifically prohibits human trafficking, asserting that all citizens have the
right to be protected from exploitation.
Rampant and ongoing sex trade in India
clearly violates the Indian Constitution and
other domestic anti-trafficking legislation,
and it simultaneously implicates India’s
obligations under the many international
treaties against trafficking in persons that
India has ratified.
More than fifty years ago, India ratified
without reservation the UN Convention
for the Suppression of the Traffick in
Persons, which instructs States Parties
to punish any person who “[e]xploits the
prostitution of another person,” even with
the person’s consent. In Articles 1 and
2 of the Convention, it further instructs
States Parties to punish any person who
“procures, entices, or leads away” another
person for the purposes of prostitution, a
person who manages and finances brothels, and a person who knowingly rents out
facilities “for the purpose of prostitution
of others.”
Shortly after ratifying this Convention,
India enacted domestic anti-trafficking
legislation, the Immoral Traffic Prevention
Act (ITPA) of 1956 (later amended in
1986). The ITPA punishes brothel owners, brothel managers, and traffickers with
prison terms ranging from three years to
life. The passage of this law indicates the
legislature’s positive intent in fulfilling
India’s international obligations. Despite
this, the inclusion of Section 7, which
penalizes those who prostitute in or near
public places, and Section 8, which penalizes the solicitation of sex, both of which
have in practice justified the police’s arrest
and imprisonment of trafficked women
who have been forced into prostitution and
who have no knowledge or control over
the brothel’s proximity to public places.
Amending the law to exclude Sections 7
and 8 would decriminalize the activities
of trafficking victims who are forced to
solicit for sex. In 2006, a bill to amend the
ITPA was proposed by India’s Ministry of
Women and Child Development, which
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would decriminalize prostitution and
instead would penalize prostitutes’ clients.
The law currently contains provisions that
penalize brothel owners, managers, and
traffickers. However, the bill did not pass.
Most recently, in 2011, India signed
the UN TIP, thus reaffirming the country’s
desire to combat sex trafficking within
the country. The goals of this protocol are
to “prevent and combat trafficking” and
“protect and assist the victims of such trafficking,” especially women and children.
The Ministry of Home Affairs also set
up specialized police units in major Indian
cities in 2011 with the sole task of investigating sex trafficking cases and arresting
traffickers and brothel owners and managers. These police officers were specially
trained and sensitized to understand how
trafficking rings operate. However, the
police lack the resources to investigate and
make arrests on every trafficking case.
For example, police in West Bengal have
called for faster rehabilitation and effective “social welfare and judiciary systems”
that can put violators of the ITPA on trial
and ensure they are not “out on bail.” In
Mumbai in 2011, 242 sex-trafficking cases
were prosecuted and 125 sex-trafficking
perpetrators were convicted in accordance
with ITPA, resulting in prison terms of three
years. Although these numbers indicate a
positive change, the overall conviction rate
is low. If the ITPA conviction rate remains
low, it will allow traffickers to perpetuate
and sustain the slave trade and the violation
of victims’ basic human rights.
Anusree Garg, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Ageism as State Policy in
Tajikistan
For any young Tajiks looking for a government job, things are looking up. But for
the aging population of Tajikistan, a recent
executive order requiring officials to fire
all government employees who are over
the age of 63 for men and 58 for women
brings only bad tidings. The government
said the policy is designed to increase its
use of technology, but some worry that
the ruling will exacerbate the decline of
Tajikistan’s intellectual capital. If the ruling is implemented, government employees who are of age to receive a pension
will be automatically fired despite their
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desire to continue working, their qualifications, and a lack of qualified replacements. By firing workers because of their
age, Tajikistan’s ruling violates Articles
6 and 7 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), Articles 2 and 23 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and Article 12 of the Madrid
International Plan of Action on Ageing
(MIPAA). It also violates Tajikistan’s own
constitution and labor codes.
By forcing older government employees to stop working, the regime is essentially condemning them to poverty. Though
government salaries are low, government
pensions are even worse and they do
not allow workers to use their positions
to make extra money, for example, by
teachers giving private lessons or doctors
seeing patients outside of their regular
office hours. Reports indicate that as of
early January, more than thirty professors have already been fired from their
positions at two of Tajikistan’s universities. Government sources say they face a
predicament of what to do: either ignore
the regime’s orders and face potential punishment, or fire those over the specified
age. Former Education Minister Munira
Inoyatova told EurasiaNet.org “many
pension-age veteran employees possess
huge human, organizational and scientific
potential. To reject this potential is to
deprive the country of a decent future.”
Inoyatova also said that public anger is rising on the issue.
By firing people based on their age and
prohibiting them from working, Tajikistan’s
government is acting contrary to Articles
6 and 7 the ICESCR, which guarantee
the right to work and make a decent living, respectively. Tajikistan acceded to the
ICESCR in 1999, making it binding on
the country. In addition to the ICESCR,
this ruling also defies Tajikistan’s own
constitution and labor codes. Article 35 of
the Tajik Constitution protects the right of
all people to work, to choose their profession, and to have their job protected. The
Constitution also states that “any kind
of limitation in employment relations is
forbidden.” Section 7 of Tajikistan’s Labor
Code specifically prohibits discrimination
in employment based on age. Firing workers from their jobs because they reach a
certain age puts the Tajik regime at odds
with its own law, international law, and
internationally recognized norms.

In addition to the inconsistency with
binding law, this ruling also contradicts
internationally recognized norms. Article
2 of the UDHR states that all people are
entitled to the same rights without distinction of any kind and Article 23 defends the
right to work and protects against unemployment. The UN General Assembly (GA)
adopted MIPAA in 2002. It was the first
global agreement recognizing older people
as contributors to their societies and asking governments to include older persons
in all social and economic development
policies. Article 12 of the MIPAA explains
that older people should have the opportunity to work, for as long as they wish and
are able to, in satisfying and productive
work. Though the UDHR and MIPAA are
not legally binding, both were adopted by
the GA and constitute international norms.
The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) stated in its document Human Rights of Older Persons that
non-discrimination is an existing human
rights norm that must be applied to older
people. Guidance from OHCHR indicates
that international standards of non-discrimination also apply to older persons,
thus making the provisions of the ICESCR
and the UDHR applicable to that group.
Freelance writer, Konstantin Parshin
noted that Tajiks are raising interesting
questions about the new order, and asked
if Tajikistan’s older leaders will step down
due to their advanced age. Perhaps the
Tajik government will recognize that this
new ruling will not only hurt many of its
citizens, but it may hurt the country as
well. Low government salaries push young
Tajiks to the private sector and abroad.
With high unemployment and emigration,
there are not many skilled workers left to
fill vacancies. Without the experience and
knowledge of older workers, Tajikistan
will not be propelled forward the way the
government is hoping and it may even
regress backwards.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.
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Europe
Ukrainian Legislation Threatens
Freedom of Expression of the
LGBT Community
A proposed Ukrainian bill commonly
referred to as the “gay gag law” passed
its initial reading on October 2, 2012. If
signed into law, this bill would drastically
restrict the right to free speech of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT)
persons. The Ukrainian draft law, officially
known as bill number 8711 and backed by
the ruling Regions Party, would criminalize the promotion of homosexuality with
fines of approximately USD $10,000 or
up to five years’ imprisonment. The bill
would impact discussion of homosexuality
in the printed media, television, and radio
by adding a provision on responsibility
for the propagation of homosexuality to
an article of the criminal code section
related to propagating violence, cruelty,
racial, national, or religious intolerance
and discrimination.
The bill’s potential reach is unclear,
although some groups speculated that it
would include limitations on the right
for LGBT persons to assemble and even
engage in handholding or other public
displays of affection. If the bill passes its
second reading, it will be signed into law
at the president’s discretion. According
to poll data collected by AIDS Alliance,
Ukrainian voters favor the law — 78% of
the country views homosexuality negatively and 61% of Kiev residents believe
that promoting homosexuality should be
punished by a prison sentence. Only 11%
oppose any punishment.
Upon proposal, the bill evoked swift
condemnation from human rights organizations and international bodies on an issue
that implicates traditional concepts of free
expression as well as an emerging field of
LGBT rights. On the intergovernmental
level, the European Parliament condemned
the bill and adopted a resolution calling for
Ukraine to shelve the law, citing the UN
Human Rights Committee’s stance that legislation of this kind is discriminatory and
infringes on free speech rights. Watchdog
nongovernmental organizations also
weighed in, with Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch calling for the
rejection of the bill because it would
discriminate against the LGBT community, violate members of the community's
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rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, and limit children’s ability
to receive and transmit information. The
two groups wrote a joint letter to the
Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, the
Verkhovna Rada, detailing their concerns.
The International Commission of Jurists
(ICJ) and the International Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
(ILGA-Europe) also condemned the draft.
The bill’s critics point to its lack of
clear definitions for the behaviors that it
seeks to criminalize. The organizations
that condemned the draft law emphasized that it could obstruct the work of
human rights defenders, endanger LGBT
activists and their families, and increase
Ukraine’s already skyrocketing HIV rate.
Supporters of the bill, including Ruslan
Kukharchuk, a founder of the local group
Love Against Homosexuality, speculated
that one interpretation of the law could
outlaw handholding and other common
public displays of affection. Without clear
definitions, courts would likely be left to
interpret the scope of the phrase “promotion of homosexuality.”
In addition to domestic concerns, the
bill would also implicate Ukraine’s treaty
obligations under both the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 11
of the ECHR protects freedom of assembly and association, which critics argue
could be curtailed under the scope of the
bill. Relevant to the concern is Ukraine’s
violent halting of a gay rights march in
2012 while allowing without incident an
“anti-gay parade.” Similarly, Article 19 of
the ICCPR protects freedom of expression
with an allowance for restrictions “[f]or
respect of the rights or reputations of others,” or “[f]or the protection of national
security or of public order . . . or of public
health or morals.” Article 21 of the ICCPR
protects the freedom of assembly with
similar restrictions. Additionally, Article
14 of the ECHR calls for a prohibition
of discrimination. The European Court
of Human Rights has held Article 14 to
encompass sexual orientation since its
1999 decision in Mouta v. Portugal, and
affirmed the recognition of LGBT protections on par with those of race, origin, or
color in relation to speech in its 2012 decision in Vejdeland v. Sweden.

The recognition of these rights has
placed European political organizations
and human rights groups at odds with
legislation in the region concerning limitations of LGBT rights. Both Lithuania
and Moldova are considering legislation
similar to the Ukrainian bill, while Russia
has already passed similar laws in several
districts and is under pressure from some
factions to enact national legislation. If
the proposed laws are enacted, they would
codify the lack of cultural acceptance of
LGBT individuals on a national level —
an approach in clear conflict with both
European and international trends. This
would create a rift in the growing movement toward recognition of equal protection for political and cultural rights of
LGBT individuals that could spread to
other similarly situated states.

Turkey Cracks Down on Opposition
in Mass Arrest of Lawyers and
Journalists
More than eighty Turkish citizens,
including journalists, lawyers, teachers,
and students, were detained as part of a
mass arrest that took place in the early
morning hours of January 18, 2013. The
arrests occurred in seven Turkish cities, at
both residential addresses and law offices,
under the authority of Article 7 of the
Turkish Anti-Terror Law of 1991. The government accused those detained of being
members of the Revolutionary People’s
Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C), labeled
a terrorist organization by the Turkish
and United States governments as well
as the European Union. Significantly, the
Turkish government applied a “secrecy
decision” to the case, whereby no details
are released to the defendants’ lawyers.
Reports out of Turkey include accusations
that several journalists were beaten and
one was deprived of the use of his inhaler
for twenty-four hours while in police custody. The lawyers arrested have denied any
connection to the DHKP-C, and instead
claim to be members of groups such as
the Contemporary Lawyers Association
(CHD), the Peoples Law Office, and the
Progressive Lawyers Association — all of
which speak out against the government
and work to protect human rights.
Mass arrests have become frequent
tactic used by the Turkish government.
Since 2009, reports indicate that the government has arrested more than 8,000
politicians, trade-unionists, journalists,
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artists, students, human rights advocates,
and lawyers. A December 2012 report by
the Committee to Protect Journalists found
that Turkey is the world’s leader in the
jailing of journalists, with at least 49 such
individuals reported as under detention at
the time of the study’s release. Although
the Turkish Government has justified the
arrest by using its Anti-Terror Law, watchdog groups such as Amnesty International
have criticized the law for being vague,
overly broad, and used to prosecute legitimate peaceful activities.
Turkey is a State Party to both the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Under these documents and Turkey’s own
Constitution, Turkish citizens are entitled
to protection from arbitrary arrest and
detention and are guaranteed freedom
of opinion and expression in the media.
Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and provides
that arrests must be conducted according
to legal procedure. Turkish law dictates
that both a prosecutor and a bar association representative must be present during
the search of law offices. Turkish police
ignored these laws when they searched the
People’s Law Office without an attending
prosecutor, and reports of beatings sustained by those arrested indicate further
deviation from Turkey’s treaty obligations.
Additionally, Article 19 of the Turkish
Constitution provides that a person who is
arrested has the right to be released during
the ensuing investigation and prosecution.
Although several journalists have been
released on substantial bail, six are still
in detention despite treaty obligations that
would provide for their release.
The ICCPR, the ECHR, and Turkey’s
Constitution all protect freedom of expression in private life and media activities.
Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10
of the ECHR protect the right to personal
expression of beliefs and opinions that do
not interfere with national security — a
right also guaranteed by Article 25 of
Turkey’s Constitution. Additionally, both
the ICCPR and Turkey’s Constitution contain articles protecting freedom of expression of private citizens with the same
narrow limitation meant to protect against
threats to national security.
Both the European Union and the
United Nations have expressed concerns
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about the arrests. The UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers stated in a 2012
publication that the judiciary in Turkey
needs “to ensure that the measures used
to combat terrorism are compatible with
international human rights principles and
standards.” The targeting of dissenting
journalists and human rights lawyers in
these mass arrests infringes upon these standards by both censoring speech and creating
a chilling effect. By invoking the national
security exceptions within both domestic
and international law, the Turkish government has taken a broad reading of the
Turkish Anti-Terror Law that pushes the
boundaries of domestic and international
obligations. While the European Court of
Human Rights could weigh in on these
boundaries, in its absence Turkey shows
no signs of halting its policies. In 2009,
the Court received 6,500 complaints concerning freedom of the press and freedom
of expression; in 2011, the number rose to
9,000. The situation has caused, and will
continue to cause, a lesser degree of security for those who seek to bring both legal
protection and exposure of the government’s inadequacies to the Turkish people.
Christa Elliott, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Middle East and North Africa
2022 World Cup and the
Exploitation of Migrant Workers
in Qatar
In December 2010, Qatar received the
honor of becoming the first Arab country
to host the FIFA (Fédération Internationale
de Football Association) World Cup. In
preparation for the 2022 games, Qatar
will spend an estimated $100 billion USD
on infrastructure and require a workforce
exceeding its 300,000 official citizens.
Although Qatar’s official citizenry is one
of the smallest in the world, the country is
home to an additional 1.2 million migrant
laborers — primarily from India, Nepal,
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
These laborers comprise 94% of the entire
Qatari population.
As a member of the International
Labour Organization (ILO), Qatar is obligated to comply with a set of minimum
employment standards. However, because

the Qatari government has yet to ratify any
substantive treaties relating to collective
bargaining rights and wage protection, the
migrant laborers are being exploited so
the country will have its high-tech stadiums
ready in time for the games. This exploitation will undoubtedly continue until Qatar
chooses to provide migrant laborers with the
right to negotiate for more equitable employment terms and safer working conditions.
To obtain a construction job, workers are required to pay a fee up to $3,651
USD. Because this sum is not readily available to the workers, many must mortgage
family properties in their native countries
or take out loans with high interest rates.
While working, laborers earn wages —
between $6.75 to $11 USD per day —
so low that they cannot leave their jobs
without being subject to financial ruin.
The ILO Convention on Forced Labour
defines compulsory labor as “all work or
service which is exacted from any person
under the menace of any penalty and for
which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily.” Because the laborers
are willingly entering into employment
contracts with the construction companies, the conventions regarding forced or
compulsory labor do not offer protection
for the laborers — despite the inability
for workers to leave employment at will.
As a member of the ILO, Qatar is broadly
required to promote the right to collective bargaining. However, because Qatar
has not ratified the Protection of Wages
Convention, which “prohibits methods of
payment which deprive the worker of
a genuine possibility of terminating his
employment,” Qatar is not obligated to
restructure the payment system or eliminate the application fee.
Working conditions for laborers who
obtain a construction job also blur the
line of acceptability. Human Rights Watch
reported that a typical worker living in a
labor camp sleeps with as many as 25 other
people in a single room and does not have
access to potable water or air-conditioning. Many workers have also reported an
absence of medical care and a denial of
free movement. Currently, Qatari labor laws
prohibit labor unions and do not establish
a minimum wage. Without the ability to
unionize, the workers are powerless.
Qatar has also received media attention concerning allegations of unreported
deaths at the construction sites. The Right
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to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention provides that any national laws
relating to workmen’s compensation for
accidents arising out of employment shall
be equally applicable to all persons. The
Qatar National Health Strategy recently
reported that workplace injuries are the
third highest cause of accidental death in
Qatar. However, the Qatari Ministry of Labor
has only reported six work-related accidents
during the last three years. Qatar has not
updated this number despite information
provided by the countries sending laborers
into the country for construction jobs.
The Supreme Committee for Qatar
2022, FIFA’s representative committee that is overseeing site construction,
has reflected its dedication to preventing
forced labor or human trafficking and
has agreed to develop “mandatory contract language and assurance protocols”
to address labor disputes. FIFA recently
decided to add labor standards to the
list of criterion required for future World
Cup bids. However, even if FIFA and the
Supreme Committee are able to reform
labor practices at the World Cup sites,
other migrant laborers in Qatar will remain
unprotected. For the migrant laborers of
Qatar to achieve any long-term changes in
the labor system, the involvement of the
Qatari government process is necessary.
Alyssa Antoniskis, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Violations Against Human Rights
Defenders in Bahrain and the
United Arab Emirates
Throughout the Middle East, human
rights defenders (HRDs) are forced to
choose between their values and their
personal security. Recent media attention
has focused on Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), where the governing regimes are consistently targeting
HRDs. These are not the only countries
in the region where this problem exists,
but consistent violations of international
law merit a discussion of their implications. By arresting peaceful protesters,
not providing fair trials, and criminalizing dissent, Bahrain and the UAE have
disregarded the individual rights protected in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR),
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and the Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders (DHRD).
Recently in Bahrain, human rights
defenders have been arrested and detained
for organizing and participating in antigovernment demonstrations and posting
about anti-government protests on social
media sites. The Bahrain Center for Human
Rights (BCHR) condemned these arrests
and detentions, saying that they are aimed
at thwarting human rights work in Bahrain.
The group claimed that government action
against HRDs is part of an effort to stop citizens from practicing their rights to freedom
of expression and assembly. BCHR said it
believes that Bahraini authorities have been
using an unfair judiciary to target critics of
the government. The Bahraini government
alleged that activists are disseminating false
information through social media sites and
that they are inciting violence during antiregime protests.
Bahrain acceded to the ICCPR in 2006;
it is thus legally binding on the country.
Article 9 of the ICCPR protects the rights
not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained
and to be informed of charges. Article
14 of the ICCPR enshrines the right to a
prompt and fair trial. Article 19 guarantees
the right to freedom of expression and
Article 21 the right to peaceful assembly.
In Bahrain, these provisions of the ICCPR
are being violated through the arrest and
trial of HRDs. The arbitrary arrests carried out by the Bahraini authorities are
contrary to the standards of international
law protecting those who are acting within
their rights and calling for peaceful protests. Human Rights Watch reported that
a prominent Bahraini HRD was charged
with inciting violence, but that the court
verdict cited no evidence that the HRD had
actually participated in or advocated for
violence. Other HRDs have experienced
excessive delays in trial proceedings. For
example, a lower court neglected to provide
the necessary documents to the appeals
court, resulting in the postponement of the
appeal process and keeping HRDs detained
longer. Article 14 of the ICCPR specifically
guarantees the right to a fair trial by an
independent and impartial court; Bahrain’s
courts are not demonstrating impartiality
and independence when it comes to HRDs.
Last month, UAE authorities enacted
a new cybercrimes decree criminalizing
online dissent against the state, effectively
closing off the UAE’s last remaining forum

for free speech. The law also criminalized
unauthorized demonstrations. Recently,
several HRDs have been arrested under
the new decree for their alleged connection to Twitter accounts that have criticized
the government. The Emirates Center
for Human Rights (ECHR) reported that
the authorities have refused to publicly
disclose the reasons behind the arrests
and will not say where the detainees are
being kept. The ECHR said it believes that
these arrests demonstrate state attempts to
silence online criticism. The UAE government insisted that the decree is intended
to monitor online content to prevent the
proliferation of racist or sectarian views
and to defend state security.
Though the UAE has not ratified the
ICCPR, it is a member of the Arab League,
which adopted the ACHR. The Charter
confirms the rights outlined in the ICCPR
and includes similar articles. The ACHR
creates binding obligations on members of
the Arab League. By criminalizing dissent
and revoking its citizens’ right to freedom
of expression, a right protected by the
ACHR, the UAE has not acted within the
parameters of the ACHR.
A troubling aspect of Bahrain and
UAE’s violations of international law is
that they are specifically directed at HRDs.
The DHRD guarantees the rights of HRDs.
The DHRD is not legally binding but
contains rights that are protected in other
agreements, like the ICCPR. Because the
DHRD was adopted by consensus in the
UN General Assembly, it represents a strong
commitment by the international community to its implementation. Bahrain and the
UAE can come into line with international
laws and norms by ending the targeting of
HRDs and taking measures to protect them.
Emily Singer Hurvitz, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Kampala Convention Breaks New
Ground for Protecting Internally
Displaced Persons
The African Union Convention for the
Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa, known as
the Kampala Convention, entered into
force on December 6, 2012. The Kampala
56

Convention is the first binding international convention containing State obligations and rights of internally displaced
persons (IDPs). This represents an express
recognition by the African Union (AU)
of the inadequate protections for IDPs in
Africa, which accounts for forty percent
of the world’s IDPs, and it is the result of a
process dating back to 2004 when the AU
Executive Council announced its intention
to draft a treaty addressing IDPs.
IDPs are persons who, without crossing
internationally recognized borders, have
been forced to flee their homes or places
of habitual residence as a result of armed
conflict, violence, human rights violations, or natural disasters. IDPs make up
a far larger population than cross-border
refugees, and one-third of the world’s IDP
populations — approximately ten million
persons — are found in 21 countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
While states have increasingly recognized IDPs over the last two decades,
the only previous international mechanism
was the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, soft law issued by the UN
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs in 1998. Although non-binding,
the Guiding Principles have served as the
basis for subsequent binding mechanisms.
The first incorporation of the Guiding
Principles also occurred in Africa, at the
sub-regional level, with the Great Lakes
Pact. While the scope of the pact was much
larger, Article 12 obligates its eleven member states of the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region to adopt and
implement the Guiding Principles.
Unlike the Guiding Principles and the
Great Lakes Pact, the Kampala Convention
is the first time states have enacted a
treaty-based legal framework specifically
for IDPs. The Kampala Convention has
three overarching goals: (1) preventing or
mitigating internal displacement; (2) protecting and assisting IDPs; and (3) promoting
solutions and support among member states.
Although the Kampala Convention does not
grant IDPs special legal status, similar to the
situation for refugees, it does outline IDPs’
rights and circumstances where States must
provide assistance to IDPs.
The Kampala Convention provides
for important protections of IDPs’ rights.
States must protect IDPs from human
rights abuses including discrimination, genocide, crimes against humanity,
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arbitrary killing, detention, torture, and
sexual or gender-based violence. In
addressing emerging trends of development-induced IDPs, States have the duty to
prevent development-based displacement
by exploring alternatives and carrying out
impact assessments. Unlike the Guiding
Principles, which consider only largescale development projects, the Kampala
Convention applies to development projects of any size.

Kampala Convention States may refer
disputes to the ACJHR only after negotiations between States have broken down.
Furthermore, the duty to accept external aid
has a limiting clause stating, “nothing in
this Article shall prejudice the principles of
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.”
This possible weakness aside, the Kampala
Convention is an important step forward in
establishing binding protections for IDPs.

As with most international conventions,
States must meet these obligations without discrimination on any grounds. The
Kampala Convention obligates States to
protect individuals from arbitrary displacement and to promote IDPs’ human rights.
It also requires that States ensure criminal
prosecution of individuals responsible for
causing displacement and violations of
IDPs’ rights and that the States provide
for “satisfactory conditions for voluntary
return, local integration or relocation on a
sustainable basis and in circumstances of
safety and dignity.”

Evidence of Malian Armed Groups’
Violations Predates International
Intervention

Article 5 of the Kampala Convention
creates a positive duty for States to accept
external humanitarian assistance. This
requirement is the first of its kind in a
human rights treaty and it is an extension
of State obligations under international
humanitarian law, which provides obligations of humane treatment and protection of
civilian populations in times of armed conflict. Previously, only soft law provisions
under international disaster response law
have addressed state obligations to accept
external assistance. As with the earlier soft
law documents, the Kampala Convention’s
obligation of third-party assistance only
requires States to accept assistance when
they lack adequate resources on their own.
In these situations, the AU will act in a
coordination capacity to target strengthening responses and resource mobilization.
Furthermore, if a state’s unwillingness to
accept assistance results in human rights
violations in order to comply, the AU may
intervene and assume the obligations under
the Convention.
Although the Kampala Convention
represents an important step forward in
protecting IDPs, a few provisions may
detract from its efficacy. Unlike the Great
Lakes Pact, which grants jurisdiction over
disputes on interpretation and implementation to the African Court of Justice
and Human Rights (ACJHR), under the

Although the French-led international
effort to aid the Malian government
brought the human rights situation in Mali
to the world’s attention, domestic ethnic
strains reached a breaking point nearly a
year before. Since the April 2012 seizure of
northern Mali by Tuareg separatist rebels,
Islamic armed forces, and Arab militias,
violence among the various factions has left
the Malian people particularly vulnerable.
The immediate conflict traces back to
January 16, 2012, with a rebellion against
the Malian government by armed groups
seeking independence and autonomy for
the Tuareg people in northern Mali, a
region known as Azawad. The conflict
developed a mix of political opposition
to the Malian government, ethnic squabbling for control of territory, and religious
extremism. By April, the ethnic Tuareg
separatist group known as the National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA) controlled northern Mali. Islamist
Ansar Dine, a group which sought to institute Sharia, the Islamic theological legal
code, also joined the rebellion. After March
2012 saw further destabilization following MNLA success, government forces
launched a coup d’état and instituted the
National Council for the Restoration of
Democracy and State (CNRDR) as the new
government with the stated goal to “wage
a total and relentless war” against MNLA.
This coup d’état was met with international
condemnation and subsequent sanctions
from the UN Security Council, the African
Union, and the Economic Community of
West African States.
With disparate factions and growing
instability, Malian civilians were caught
in the middle of violence from multiple
sides. Following the expulsion of government forces in northern Mali, the ethnic
tensions between the Tuareg MNLA and
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the National Liberation Front of Azawad
(FNLA) undercut regional security. The
FNLA opposed Tuareg rule in Azawad,
which led the Front for Liberation of
Azawad (FPA) to split off from the MNLA
in opposition to Islamists and a focus
on autonomy over independence. Within
this vacuum of control, jihadist group
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
and its splinter group the Movement
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
(MOJWA) also sought to gain a foothold in the region. MOJWA has been in
constant conflict with MNLA and has
opposed Tuareg rule in Azawad.
In the course of taking over Azawad
and through infighting, reports indicate
numerous acts that could invoke international humanitarian law (IHL) and human
rights law, but the nature of the conflict
leaves unclear what law even applies —
and none of the legal distinctions have
yet to deter any actions against Malian
civilians.
Ansar Dine, MOJWA, and AQIM are
reportedly using children as young as
twelve — acts generally barred under the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict. Furthermore,
reports from Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch indicate that these
groups have engaged in summary executions, murder, abduction, inhumane treatment — sometimes in support of Sharia
law — and sexual and gender-based violence as prohibited in various human rights
instruments to which Mali is a State Party.
In a conflict situation, such as in Mali,
the limitations of human rights law become
apparent. Although human rights law is
already a difficult tool to utilize to prevent
violations during an ongoing conflict, it is
more difficult in Mali because it generally
applies only to state actors, leaving questions about how it applies with no controlling government. Although the human
rights protections are in effect at all times,
there is no enforceable obligation for nonstate actors.
Reported actions by these groups also
implicate IHL, which in conflict situations can have a broader application than
human rights law because it could apply to
all parties involved. However, application
depends on the characteristics of the situation — namely whether it can be classified
as an armed conflict — and can also allow
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for some violence that is a valid use of
force in combat that would otherwise be
banned under human rights law. Reports
have indicated the various groups have
targeted and pillaged hospitals, churches,
and schools, which — if they were directly
targeted — could implicate both Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
customary law.

The violations have prompted the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to
open an investigation into the conflict and
to reports of government forces engaging in extra-judicial killings of suspected
members of these armed groups. The obligations for human rights violations will
likely remain difficult to apply until a
more stable government is reestablished, at
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which point the State would be responsible
for protecting the application of rights to
people within its borders.
Tyler Addison, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

